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and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
"The problem in Saudi Arabia is that the middle class is shrinking, and the more poverty you have, the 
more fundamentalism you have." 
Turki Hamad 
Introduction 
For an increasing number of its citizens, the Saudi Arabia of the heady years following the 1973-1974 oil 
price revolution is a land of fable and memory. Yet to many outside the Kingdom, the country's economic 
statistics may come as a shock. Population growth (about 3.3 percent per year) has exceeded Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth for several decades. The result has been a decline in per capita GDP 
from more than U.S. $15,000 in 1980 to about U.S. $9,000 in 2003 (adjusted for inflation). There is high 
unemployment (20 to 30 percent by some measures), while up to 20-30 percent of the population falls 
below the poverty line. 
Translating these figures into more tangible signs of trouble for the Saudi Government, Kim Murphy has 
observed: 
The dozen years since the Persian Gulf War have seen slums grow up on the outskirts of Jeddah and 
Riyadh, the capital. Beggars hawk bottles of water at intersections. Penniless women huddle in strips of 
shade outside their crumbling mud-brick houses, begging for money. Many families in the capital are so 
poor they can't afford electricity. Raw sewage runs through parts of Jeddah… The increasingly perilous 
economic situation that all in Saudi Arabia but the royalty face today may be a big factor in recruiting 
young Saudis to terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda. Chronic joblessness, diminished incomes and 
difficulty in collecting enough money to marry and start families are all issues that can evoke anger.[1]  
The deteriorating economic situation is manifesting itself in new and troubling ways. Virtually free of crime 
since its founding, the country's deeply conservative Islamic society is grappling with a rapid increase in 
crime. Crime among young jobless Saudis rose by 320 percent between 1990 and 1996, and was 
expected to go up by another 136 percent by 2005.[2]  
To counter these trends, Crown Prince Abdullah, the kingdom's de-facto leader, has announced plans for 
sweeping reforms including privatization, liberalization and diversification of the economy.[3] However, 
implementing them will not be easy. Conservative opposition within the ruling family is strong and limits 
the pace of reform.[4] Barring major reforms, the financial cost of state-lead economic diversification may 
reach upwards of U.S. $100 billion over the next twenty years. And the country's national debt is already 
over 100 percent of GDP. Even with an improved oil picture, the Saudi government may simply not be 
able to finance the diversification of the economy without extensive private sector participation.  
On the other hand, the international scene provides no quick fixes either; and bringing in private foreign 
investors is not without its own problems. The increased presence of foreign businessmen will further 
strain relations between the government and the kingdom's more traditional groups. The Saudi 
government also has to convince the foreign investment community that the kingdom is a secure place to 
do business, and not a battleground between the royal family-dominated government and international 
terrorists. 
 
Saudi Arabia's problems have been decades in the making and certainly will not be solved quickly. This 
essay identifies the main factors responsible for Saudi Arabia's economic deterioration. Have 
fundamental changes taken place in the economy, perhaps since 1980, to cause the decline in non-
oil economic growth? If so, what are they? And what are their implications for the future? 
Trends in the Economy 
The inability of the Saudi non-oil economy to sustain high rates of growth is evident in the historical record 
(Table 1). The overall rate of real non-oil GDP growth has averaged 7.4 percent from 1960-2002 (7.1 
from 1970 to 2002). However, expansion since 1980 (2.3 percent) has not even kept up with the growing 
population. While one might argue the -0.9 percent average annual decline in oil GDP (1980-2002) is 
responsible for this sub-par performance, government expenditure, the means through which oil revenues 
are actually spread through the economy, grew at the higher rate of 3.0 percent per annum. Several 
important patterns, mainly evolving since the early 1980s, help to explain this deterioration in Saudi non-
oil economic growth.  
Public/Private Composition of Gross Domestic Product 
The Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency breaks the country's GDP into three main categories: public sector 
output, private sector output and the oil sector's contribution to GDP.[5] The relative growth of private 
sector output as a percentage of total GDP is the main pattern of interest (Figure 1). In the pre-1973-1974 
period, private sector activity accounted for around 30 percent of the country's output. This fell slightly 
following the 1973-1974 oil price increases, only to increase to 60 percent by 1985. Since then, private 
sector output has declined gradually, leveling off at around 48 percent of output. 
In contrast, the public sector's output averaged around 12 percent before 1973-1974. Thereafter, the 
public sector's share increased steadily to slightly over 20 percent (1983), leveling off at around 18 
percent through 2002.  
Finally, the oil sector averaged approximately 55 percent of GDP prior to the 1973-1974 oil price jump. 
The sector's share of output then declined sharply to around 20 percent in 1985 before increasing through 
the rest of the 1980s, leveling off at around 35 percent of output starting in the early 1990s. 
If an oil country's success is depicted by its ability to diversify away from a dependence on oil revenues, 
then the Saudi picture is mixed. The private sector has been able to expand its share of output to the 
point that it now accounts for around half of the kingdom's GDP. But this is actually 10 percent lower than 
the peak attained in the mid-1980s. While the sector appears capable of sustaining this percentage of 
output through much different periods of oil prices and revenues, indicating some independence from 
year to year oil market fluctuations, the sector has not shown it is capable of high rates of sustained 
growth. Interestingly, the public sector's share of output has been quite stable since the early 1980s. 
Composition of Output by Sectors 
Among the more striking features of Saudi economic growth since the mid-1960s are the sharp changes 
in composition of non-oil output (Figure 2). The 1973-1974 oil price increases caused steep increases in 
the construction, trade and housing sectors. Since then, construction dropped precipitously before 
leveling off at around 12 percent of private sector output while housing fell off as well to around 8 percent. 
Trade (retail and wholesale) was least affected and has averaged around 27 percent of private sector 
expenditures since the late 1980s. 
Another feature of interest is the agricultural sector, which, after declining in relative importance up to the 
early 1980s, has increased its share of non-oil private output from around 8 percent at that time to 17-18 
percent and has held that figure stable since the late 1980s. The most stable activity, however, appears 
to be the non-oil manufacturing sector. This sector's share in private sector output was not affected by the 
1973-1974 oil boom. Instead, it has gradually increased its share of private sector output from about 5 
percent in 1968 to around 14 percent in 2002. 
While great strides have been made in increasing total private sector output, the sectors contributing to 
overall output have all returned to their pre-oil boom pattern. The main exception is the non-refining 
private manufacturing sector. 
Public/Private Composition of Expenditures 
The composition of output between public/private consumption and investment has produced several 
interesting patterns over time (Figure 3). The most stable series is private investment, averaging slightly 
above 10 percent of total expenditures. Interestingly, the share of private sector investment was not 
significantly affected by the 1973-1974 oil price increases; nor did it expand while private sector activity 
grew as a share of GDP from 1973-1974 to 1985. 
In contrast, private consumption's share of expenditures dropped from a high of 70 percent in 1960 to 
around 30 percent in 1973-1974. Since that time, private consumption, while fluctuating a bit, has moved 
back up to approximately half of total expenditures. Public consumption gradually increased from less 
than 20 percent of expenditures in 1960 to around 30 percent at the time of the oil price increases. Since 
then, the public sector's consumption has fluctuated in the low 30s, with no particular trend. 
Of the four expenditure variables, public investment has shown the most notable trends, gradually 
increasing its share from near zero in 1960 to around 25 percent in 1975. Since then, public expenditures 
gradually trended down, closing at near 5 percent by 2002. 
These patterns and trends suggest that the kingdom is living on borrowed time: falling public and 
stagnant private investment rates in the context of a rapidly growing population mean increased domestic 
bottlenecks and capacity constraints that reduce the country's sustainable growth potential. Many of these 
constraints, such as power shortages, are reported on a regular basis in the popular press. 
Patterns of Public-Private Expenditure/Non-Oil Output 
Another way of looking at the problem of the kingdom's rather low rates of investment is to compare the 
various expenditure items to non-oil GDP. Again there are several relatively stable patterns and several 
that depict longer-term trends (Figure 4). Private expenditures have been relatively stable with respect to 
non-oil GDP, generally fluctuating within a range of 80 and 100 percent of output. The early 1990s 
brought an increase in this ratio, followed by a fairly sharp contraction from 1996 to 2002. Overall 
consumption (public plus private) also reflects this pattern, albeit at a higher level, averaging around 120 
percent of non-oil GDP, with imports balancing supply and demand. 
On the other hand, public expenditures alone increased fairly steadily over the twenty-year period leading 
up to 1980, only to decline fairly steadily before leveling off at around 55 percent of non-oil GDP. 
Investment follows a similar pattern, rising fairly steadily to over 60 percent of non-oil GDP in the late 
1970s then declining to around 22 percent throughout the 1990s.  
While investment is not the only important factor in determining future rates of growth in non-oil GDP, a 
country of Saudi Arabia's vast resources should be able to mobilize larger amounts of capital. Investment 
as a share of non-oil GDP has essentially returned to the levels found in the 1960s. Again the inability of 
the country to devote more funds to capital formation will limit the economy's ability to just keep up with 
the rapidly expanding population.  
Public Expenditures 
The kingdom has experienced on-going budget difficulties since the mid-1980s. Growing deficits have 
been the norm, with non-oil revenues unable to pick up the slack during periods of falling oil revenues. 
Less well known is that the composition of public expenditures has undergone profound changes during 
this period. Aggregating the main budgetary items into four main groups, several patterns stand out 
(Figure 5).  
Corresponding to the declines in investment noted above, economic expenditures (economic services, 
transport and communications, and infrastructure) have declined steadily since 1980, ending at a little 
over 7 percent by 2003. Social expenditures (human resource development and health) have been the 
major beneficiaries of this decline, more than doubling their share of the budget over the period 1979-
2003 (from 13 percent to nearly 32 percent of total expenditures). Defense remains the largest budgetary 
item, fluctuating in the 35-40 percent range in the period after 1988. 
Finally, public expenditures (administration, loans, and subsidies) have been especially erratic. After 
fluctuating around 35 percent of the budget between 1979 and 1994, they fell to less than 20 percent in 
1999, then increased to 27 percent in 2003. The sharp decline in public expenditures in the early-mid 
1990s stemmed in part from a sharp cut-back in the government's loan programs. 
Key Economic Linkages 
These patterns suggest that the public sector is contracting in many areas.[6] This is especially true for 
economic expenditures and other activities directly supportive of the private sector. Budgetary shifts away 
from economic categories are the most obvious manifestation of this phenomenon. Falling shares of 
investment relative to non-oil output also indicate that the kingdom's capital stock and productive 
expenditures are playing much less of a simulative role as in the unbalanced growth strategy implicit in 
the early oil boom years.[7] 
More subtle shifts in policy or policy effectiveness can only be inferred from a statistical analysis of the 
patterns noted above. Of particular importance are the linkages between public and private sector 
expenditures on non-oil production and investment. If a connection exists between these variables, how 
much can we attribute this to short-run effects (oil shocks and the like) and how much represents longer-
term affinities? For example, private sector investment is likely to be stimulated with an oil boom-led 
expansion of public infrastructure investment. But is it dependent on ongoing government investment, or 
could it be sustained by non-public induced investment opportunities? Have these patterns changed over 
time? Resolving issues of this type is a critical first step in designing a reform strategy for the country.  
To identify the main policy-relevant linkages in the Saudi economy a co-integration/error-correction 
analysis was undertaken. While fairly technical mathematically, this technique has a straightforward 
intuitive appeal. Cointegration/error-correction can determine whether two series (such as private 
expenditures and private sector output) move together over long periods of time due to some real 
interconnection.[8] For example, if in the case of Saudi Arabia we find that this relationship exists between, 
say, government expenditure and private sector output, then it would be safe to conclude that private 
sector output could not be sustained without a steady infusion of government expenditures.  
More precisely, the analysis accepts the fact that short run shocks can occur whereby rapid increases 
(public sector investment) in one variable influence the other (construction). However, if the two variables 
have developed a long-run linkage whereby an ongoing-stable set of links have been established, then 
equilibrium will be restored with the speed of adjustment affected by the deviation from that long run 
pattern. Specifically the speed of the longer-term adjustment will be dependent on the magnitude of the 
deviation from the long run equilibrium pattern as well as the strength of the linkage between the two 
variables. The year-to-year growth over time of a sector such as non-oil manufacturing can be 
decomposed into two parts: the first associated with a short run shock (say, increased public sector 
consumption) and the second drawing on the longer-term linkages established with the causal (here, 
public sector consumption) variable. This technique can yield insights not often captured by more 
conventional regression methods. 
Relative Efficacy of Public Private Expenditures 
A common theme in development literature is that economic processes in oil-based countries become 
more complex as these economies mature and begin to diversify away from a complete reliance on oil 
revenues and associated public sector expenditures. Using cointegration analysis, there is clear evidence 
that this process is well advanced in Saudi Arabia. With regard to the economy's leading sectors (Table 1):  
1. Growth in the agricultural and mining sectors became more dependent on private expenditures 
and less dependent on public expenditures, especially during the period 1975-2001.  
2. The non-oil manufacturing sector has become almost completely dependent on private sector 
expenditures, with strong linkages to these expenditures in both the short- and long-term. In 
contrast, public sector expenditures now have little simulative effects on the sector.  
3. Traditionally the wholesale and retail trade sectors have been dependent on both public and 
private sector expenditures. While this remains the case for private sector expenditures, public 
sector expenditures currently have only a short-run transitory effect on the trade sector's output.  
4. In a major change from earlier periods, output in the construction sector is no longer dependent 
on public expenditures. Instead, output in this sector now depends primarily on the long-term 
pattern of private sector expenditures.  
5. Private expenditures have strengthened their linkages to the housing sector as well as the 
transport, storage and communications sectors. While output in this sector is still responsive to 
public sector expenditures, this linkage has weakened over time.  
6. Other financial activities are dependent on private expenditures. However, with regard to public 
expenditures, this effect is confined to the longer-term effects of governmental expenditures.  
7. Finally, linkages between private expenditures and the service sector (community, social and 
personal services) have strengthened considerably in recent years. This sector's links to public 
sector expenditures have also weakened.  
In sum, the pattern found here is one of strengthening linkages between private sector expenditures and 
sectoral output. At the same time the ability of public sector expenditures to provide a positive stimulus to 
output has weakened considerably. In two key sectors—non-oil manufacturing and construction—public 
sector expenditures no longer play a role in affecting output growth. In others—agriculture, mining, trade 
and services—public expenditures may only play a minor role in the overall growth of these areas of 
activity.  
The Impact of Public Expenditures on Private Expenditures 
Of course, one could always argue the unlikelihood of private sector expenditures being sustained without 
a steady infusion of government expenditures. If that is the case, the links between public sector 
expenditures and sectoral output still exist, but have only become more indirect with time. To test this 
hypothesis, a statistical analysis similar to that between public/private expenditures and sectoral output 
was undertaken. Is private expenditure dependent on government expenditures, and has this pattern 
changed with time? The main findings (Table 2) suggest that over time there has been a weakening of 
the linkage between public and private expenditures similar to that occurring between public sector 
expenditures and real output. In fact, the only statistically significant link between public expenditure and 
private expenditure in the period from 1980-2001 occurred with an expansion in public infrastructure 
providing a short-term stimulus to private investment. However, the longer-term effects present between 
these two variables in the period 1964-1980 are apparently no longer present. 
The question immediately arises as to the factors responsible for the deterioration in links between 
government expenditures and, for all practical purposes, the rest of the economy. Given the fall in the 
relative share of government expenditures in such areas as non-oil GDP, diminishing returns can no 
doubt be ruled out. A more likely source of the decline in the strength of public sector linkages appears to 
be the major changes in the composition of the government's budget noted above (Figure 5). 
Expenditure Categories and Revenues 
Again, aggregating the various sections of the government's budget into four main categories (social 
expenditures, economic expenditures, public expenditures and defense) several interesting statistical 
patterns emerge to explain the falling simulative effect of public expenditures on the non-oil private sector. 
First, looking at the links between government revenues and expenditures (Table 3), economic 
expenditures, public expenditures and defense follow a similar pattern: each expands in the short-run with 
increased government revenues (they would contract with falling revenues). This pattern carries over into 
the longer term with each category of expenditure maintaining a stable relationship with revenues. 
Yet there appear to be no links between revenues and social expenditures. As noted, this has been the 
fastest growing category of expenditures. More importantly, it now dominates the government budget 
alongside defense. The fact that the expansion in social expenditures appears to be independent of the 
government's revenue position suggests that either these allocations receive a much higher priority over 
other expenditures and/or that the government is willing to run large deficits to fund these programs. Their 
rather steady increase until the last several years means that they have played a limited role in fiscal 
macroeconomic stabilization.  
Social Expenditures and Budgetary Tradeoffs 
A closer look at social expenditures finds that their budgetary share has grown largely at the expense of 
several economic sections of the budget (Table 4), namely transport and communications and direct 
economic allocations. In both cases, short run increases in social expenditures had a negligible impact on 
their budgetary shares. However, the more fundamental long-term impact was negative. The only 
economic category not adversely affected was infrastructure, where social expenditures did not affect this 
category's budgetary share. 
The dramatic decline in the budgetary share of subsidies may be attributed in part to the growth of social 
expenditures. Both the short- and long-term impacts of expanded social expenditures reduced the 
proportion of the budget allocated to subsidies.  
Interestingly, defense allocations did not suffer at the hands of social expenditures.[9] Short-run increases 
in the budgetary share going to social categories actually increased the share of the budget controlled by 
defense. The same was true for allocations to municipalities. Governmental loans were the only 
budgetary sub-category unaffected by the expansion of social expenditures. The contraction of this 
category apparently was due in part to a shift in governmental priorities rather than a direct allocation 
conflict with social expenditures. 
Fiscal Linkages: Government Expenditures and Revenues 
The high priority given to social expenditures, followed by defense, together with limited oil revenues 
during most of this period, resulted in a tremendous contraction in the public sector's allocation to 
economic services of various types. This is verified by a final statistical analysis of the relationship 
between government revenues and public consumption and investment. 
As one might imagine, in a country as resource-constrained as Saudi Arabia has become, a strong link 
exists between revenues and expenditures (Table 5). However, this pattern does not hold for the sub-
categories of total expenditures (national accounts measure). In the case of public consumption, changes 
in revenues do not have a significant impact on year-to-year allocations. One interpretation is that much 
of this expenditure represents salaries or the high priority social programs that cannot or will not be 
altered by the authorities: they are relatively immune from short-run revenue fluctuations. Over time, 
however, these categories form a strong long-term relationship with revenues. 
In contrast, public investment appears much more discretionary in the short term, expanding and 
contracting with similar movements in revenues. On the other hand, public capital formation is not 
assured a growing budget in line with revenues (as is the case with consumption). Despite the long-term 
implementation of capital projects, they have no corresponding link with the government's available 
revenues. Public capital formation is treated as a low priority, discretionary section of the budget. 
All and all, it is surprising that Saudi Arabia has not taken steps to establish an oil stabilization fund, which 
would receive windfall revenues when oil prices are high and disperse funds for government operations 
when they are low.[10] Given the country's huge reserve base and relatively small population, there 
appears to be no perceived need to save some current oil revenues and invest them for future 
generations. 
Assessment 
Sooner or later, government expenditures will have to be refocused on activities that directly support 
private sector investment. The welfare state will have to be scaled back and economic allocations given a 
higher priority. More emphasis must be placed on efficiency and productivity in government activities. 
There is tremendous waste in government ministries that will have to be dealt with. A recent study found 
that 69 percent of civil servants in the Kingdom stay away from work without a good reason while 54 
percent come to work late.[11] An environment that encourages investment and provides better 
incentives for risk taking and job creation must be created. While recently coming under criticism in many 
quarters, the neo-liberal model is still a good medium-term target.[12]  
A model of growth and terrorism developed by Bremer and Kasarda has great relevance for Saudi 
Arabia.[13] They see countries moving through three distinct stages as their economies evolve, becoming 
more sophisticated and market-driven. By their criterion, Saudi Arabia falls in the first stage (along with 
Egypt, Iran and Pakistan [Figure 6]). This group has failed to move forward to the middle stage largely 
because of growth-limiting policies and institutional rigidities. As Bremer and Kasarda note, "History 
suggests that failure to make steady progress through the New Second World transition's early phase to 
the middle period is extremely dangerous. If the transition stalls here—as it did in post-World War I 
Russia, and as it has now in much of the Middle East—failure can lead to revolution and Al Qaeda-style 
international violence." The one thing that the nations stuck in the early phase have in common is 
slowness in adopting choice-based systems. Bremer and Kasarda define "choice-based" systems as 
encompassing both market-based economies and democratic political institutions and organizations. 
None of this bodes particularly well for the Saudis. Ten or fifteen years ago when many of the economy's 
problems were becoming apparent,[14] the government had time on its side. A well-thought-out neoliberal 
reform program stressing free markets, access to capital, and integration into the world economy could 
have been undertaken at a safe pace, laying the foundation for the transition to a higher growth path (and 
the middle stage of development discussed by Bremer and Kasarda). Instead, Riyadh postponed hard 
decisions, hoping that a new oil boom would solve its problems. None was forthcoming or will likely be in 
the foreseeable future. Instead Saudi authorities find an economy still mired in the first stage and facing 
an unemployment rate approaching 30 percent.[15] Poverty is on the rise and, even more ominous, more 
and more Saudis complain that corrupt members of the royal family are plundering their national wealth. 
Increasingly one hears commentaries like this: 
[T]here's a lot of frustration and anxiety among young Saudi men. Almost half of them have lost hope for 
the future. And they are ripe for recruitment by Islamic extremists… Adding to the frustration are the lack 
of outlets for discussion and debate. Trade unions are barred as are all other professional associations… 
Saudi society has few political tools to counter the extremism that has taken root here and the results are 
actions like the recent bombings in Riyadh.[16]  
In this charged environment, reform has taken on an urgency never seen before in Saudi Arabia. 
Hopefully it is effective and not too late. 
For more insights into contemporary international security issues, see our Strategic Insights home 
page. 
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email ccc@nps.navy.mil with subject line "Subscribe". There is no charge, and your address will be 
used for no other purpose. 
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